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ABSTRACT: We develop a diagrammatic framework to study the economic 
linkages between regions or cities.  Hitherto, such linkages have not been a 
focus of the literature.  We use the framework to analyse the impact of shocks 
that occur in one region (eg productivity improvements or increases in housing 
supply) on other regions, highlighting the key adjustment mechanisms and their 
long run implications for incomes, the cost of living, and the spatial distribution 
of population.  We link our approach to both the New Economic Geography and 
Urban Systems literatures and review empirical studies that quantify the key 
mechanisms that we have identified.  
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1. Introduction. 
 
While the primary impact of an economic change may be focused in a particular city or 
region, its effects may also be felt in other regions.  There are interdependencies across 
places so that what happens in one region has implications not only for this location but 
for other regions as well.  The objectives of this paper are to investigate these linkages, 
identifying the channels through which these effects operate and their net impact. The 
issue is important because, as we will see, under some circumstances changes that 
benefit one region also have positive effects on other areas.  When this complementary 
relationship between regions holds, the impact of a shock is in some sense shared 
between regions. Under other circumstances, however, regions are in a competitive 
rather than a complementary relationship with one another.  A positive shock to one 
region has a negative impact elsewhere, with the result that the effects on the first region 
are amplified at the expense of other regions. 
Understanding the circumstances under which these alternatives occur is crucial 
for understanding regional inequalities, and for evaluating the effects of policy.  
Consider two examples. A policy measure raises productivity and hence wages in one 
city or region.  Does this increase wages in other regions also, or are spatial differences 
in wages amplified by population movement and consequent changes in earnings?  An 
expansion in housing stock in a high price region is intended to narrow regional house 
price differentials.  Does it do this, or is it offset – or even overturned – by induced 
migration and higher earnings in the growing region?  The answers to these questions 
turn on whether regions are in a complementary or competing relationship with each 
other, terms that we will make precise in the course of the paper. 
 Our technique for investigating these issues and establishing the relationship 
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between regions is primarily diagrammatic.  We develop a framework that shows how 
two regions in an economy interact, and illustrates how there can be equilibrium spatial 
disparities.  We use the framework to analyse the effect of a change in one region on 
another and to show how – depending on a few key elasticities – equilibrium adjustment 
may dampen or amplify shocks. 
 The framework is based on three key relationships.  The first is the ‘earnings-
employment’ relationship, which captures the supply side of the economy.  The form of 
this relationship depends critically on whether there are increasing or decreasing returns 
to expanding employment in a region.  The second is the ‘cost-of-living’ relationship, 
which captures the effects of levels of employment on prices of goods and assets in the 
region.  It depends on characteristics of goods markets and, above all, land and housing 
markets.  The third is the ‘migration relationship’, linking population movements 
between regions. 
We express each of these relationships in a ‘reduced form’ way, and show how 
the interaction between regions depends on the shape of the relationships.  Our focus is 
on the long-run equilibrium of the economy and, for clarity, we abstract from many of 
the real life frictions that may arise from imperfect information or adjustment costs. 
This approach has, we hope, the benefits of being relatively accessible and independent 
of the details of particular modelling approaches.  However, these reduced form 
relationships summarise the micro-economic detail of a wide range of economic 
models, and it is important that they are linked to models in the literature.  The later 
sections of the paper relate these relationships to the theoretical underpinnings provided 
in the literatures on economic geography, regional economics, and urban systems, and 
to the empirical quantification of these relationships. 
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2.   Linkages: a Diagrammatic Approach. 
 
The main objective of the paper is to develop an analytical framework that can be used 
to understand the equilibrium of a multi-region economy and establish the comparative 
static effects of ‘shocks’ to one of the regions.  The text develops the argument 
diagrammatically for a two region economy, while a more general algebraic analysis for 
a multi-region economy is presented in the appendix.  We shall refer to the two regions, 
as N and S.  The total labour force in the economy is fixed at unity and can be divided 
between the two regions with S having share λ and N having 1 - λ.   We will assume that 
the labour force in each region is proportional to both population and employment, 
thereby abstracting from differences in demographic structure, in regional participation 
or employment rates, or commuting between regions.1   
We focus on three key ‘reduced form’ relationships which can be captured in a 
four quadrant diagram.  
 
Earnings-employment (EE):  The first relationship we refer to as the earnings-
employment relationship and it determines the wage that is paid to workers in a region 
as a function of the labour force in the region. Denoting wage rates in N and S by wN 
and wS , the earnings-employment relationship can be written as: 
  
)(λwaw SS = ,      )1( λ−= waw NN      (1) 
 
where aN and aS are productivity parameters, and the function w(.) gives the relationship 
between earnings and employment.  We will denote the elasticity of this relationship 
by wη , noting that the elasticity may vary with λ.  The shape of this relationship depends 
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on technology and market interactions. For example, if product and labour markets are 
perfectly competitive and there are diminishing returns to labour then the function gives 
the marginal value product of labour, and wη  ≤ 0.
2   If there are increasing returns 
(internal or external to firms) then it is possible that wη  > 0, and we discuss the forces 
that shape the relationship in this case in section 5.  The relationship also depends on the 
mobility of other factors of production.  In the within-country context we think of 
capital markets as being integrated, so the rate of return is the same in all regions and 
any diminishing returns would come from regionally immobile factors of production. 3 
 
The earnings-employment relationship is illustrated in the top left quadrant of 
figure 1 by curve EE.  Because we are interested in the linkages between regions the 
figure is constructed in terms of the division of the labour force between regions, and 
the relative values of the price variables in each region.  Thus, the horizontal axis of the 
top-left quadrant is λ, the share of the labour force in S, and the vertical is relative 
wages, wS /wN .  That is: 
 
EE:  ( )( ) )()1(/)(// λλλ Wwwaaww NSNS ≡−= ,    (2) 
 
where the function W(λ) summarises the relationship and is assumed to be invertible.  
The interpretation of the relationship is straightforward.  Given a division of the labour 
force between the two regions, λ, the curve shows the associated relative wage wS /wN .  
The case illustrated is one with diminishing marginal returns to labour, wη  < 0, so that 
an expansion of relative employment in S leads to a fall in the relative wage in S.  We 
will look at the case where wη  > 0 in section 3. 
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Cost of living (HH): High relative earnings in a region should encourage migration into 
that region, but migration in turn has implications for the cost of living.  There are 
several mechanisms through which population can affect the cost of living, the most 
direct of which is through the fact that people consume space. Increasing the labour 
force in a region bids up the prices of houses (and residential land) and so raises the cost 
of living.  This relationship is steeper the less elastic is housing supply (eg due to 
planning regulations) and the greater is the share of housing in expenditure.   
We denote the cost of living in each region by hS , hN  and assume, for the 
moment, that it is a function only of the labour force in the region. Thus,  
 
( )SS bhh /λ= ,      ( )NN bhh /)1( λ−=      (3) 
 
where, once again, bS and bN  are shift parameters and  h(.) is the functional relationship 
linking the cost of living to the labour force. The elasticity of the cost of living with 
respect to the labour force is denoted hη , and may vary with λ.  The parameters bS and  
bN  can be interpreted as exogenous factors that shift the supply of (or demand for) land, 
so an equiproportional increase in bS and λ has no effect on the cost of living in S.  
Taking the ratio of these expressions,   
 
HH:  ( ) ( ) )(/)1(/// λλλ Hbhbhhh NSNS ≡−=     (4) 
 
where the function H(λ) summarises the relationship, and is assumed to be invertible. 
This relationship is illustrated in the bottom right quadrant of figure 1, drawn 
with 0>hη , so that greater population is associated with higher cost of living. 
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While we have written the cost of living as a function of the labour force, λ, 
notice that the expression can be interpreted more generally.  For example, the demand 
for housing may depend also on wages. Indeed, as we discuss in section 5, the income 
effect on prices may even be bigger than the population effect. However, as wages are 
themselves a function of λ (equation (1)), the function h(.) is a reduced form that can 
incorporate these effects. The implications for the shape of h(.) will depend on the 
nature of the function w(.) as discussed in the appendix.4  Other factors may also enter 
this relationship, including goods prices and intra-regional commuting costs, and these 
are, again, discussed further in section 5. 
 
Migration (MM):  We assume that workers are potentially mobile between regions and 
that they move in response to real wage differences between regions.  Long run 
equilibrium occurs therefore when real wages, adjusted by amenity values, are equalised 
across regions. Since real wages are nominal wages divided by the cost of living index, 
the migration equilibrium schedule is determined by the condition, 
 
MM: NNNSSS hwchwc // =  or equivalently ( )( )SNNSNS cchhww /// = ,  (5) 
 
where cS and  cN  are shift parameters that reflect, for example, amenities in the two 
regions.  If cS = cN  then this migration equilibrium schedule is simply the 45% line as 
illustrated by the line MM in the top right hand quadrant of figure 1.  Above the line 
workers in S are better off than those in N , so there is a tendency for migration from N 
to S, and conversely below the line. 
With three economic relationships for three pairs of endogenous variables (the 
labour force in each region, wages and costs of living) the fourth quadrant is 
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conceptually redundant, and the line LL is simply the 45o line, matching values of λ 
across quadrants. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 here 
 
3.  Equilibrium. 
 
Together, these relationships determine the long run equilibrium distribution of workers 
between regions and the associated levels of earnings and costs of living.  The full long 
run equilibrium of this system occurs when values of λ, wS /wN , and hS /hN  are 
consistent with all relationships holding simultaneously. This long run equilibrium 
could take time to achieve if people do not respond instantly to real wage differentials.  
If adjustment takes time, expectations may matter for both the nature of long run 
equilibrium and for the adjustment path between equilibria (e.g. whether there is 
overshooting). These issues, while beyond the scope of this paper, are certainly 
interesting and the subject of a small but growing literature. Henceforth, we abstract 
from them and consider only the long run equilibrium as defined here.5  
In the simplest case, in which the two regions are symmetric (aS /aN = bS /bN  = 
cS /cN  = 1) there is an equilibrium at which λ = ½ and relative values of all price 
variables are unity. Before applying the framework we need to spend some time 
outlining how equilibrium is attained, and distinguishing between three different cases – 
distinctions that will be crucial when we come to comparative static analysis. 
 
3.1  Complementary regions: 
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Figure 1 illustrates the case of ‘complementary regions’.  The equilibrium is shown by 
the points indicated by circles and joined by the dashed lines.   
To understand the diagram it is helpful to consider the following thought 
experiment. Suppose that the initial situation is one in which employment in S is 
relatively high, as at point A on the LL curve. Tracing up to the EE curve gives the value 
of relative wages corresponding to relative employment at A. Similarly, tracing over to 
the HH curve gives the relative cost of living.  Looking at the MM quadrant, we see that 
these levels of relative wages and living costs correspond to the point A’ which is below 
the MM curve, meaning that real wages in N are above those in S.   As we move point A 
along the LL line in the bottom left quadrant, relative wages and relative living costs 
change, tracing out the dashed curve ZZ in the top right quadrant. Thus the ZZ curve 
traces out combinations of relative wages and relative living costs, given the 
employment-earnings and cost of living relationships.   
 Now, recall that the MM curve gives the combinations of relative wages and 
relative living costs at which real incomes in the two regions are equal.  Thus, the long 
run equilibrium must be at the intersection of MM and this derived curve ZZ.  At this 
point relative wages and living costs are consistent with the division of the labour force 
between regions, and there is no incentive for workers to migrate from one region to the 
other. 
Notice that this equilibrium is stable, in the sense that labour migration is an 
equilibrating force.  To see this, once again consider starting at labour allocation A. 
Workers in S have a lower level of real income than workers in N (point A’). As a result, 
workers migrate from S to N moving the economy along the LL line in the direction of 
the arrow.  As λ declines, wS /wN  increases (the EE relationship) and  hS /hN  falls (the 
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HH relationship), moving along ZZ in the direction of the arrow until the equilibrium is 
reached.     
For reasons that will become clear when we turn to comparative statics, we 
define the configuration illustrated in figure 1 as the ‘complementary case’.  The aspect 
of the configuration that matters for comparative statics is that the ZZ curve is 
downwards sloping. The ZZ relationship is derived by eliminating λ from the EE and 
HH curves, 
 
ZZ:                                 ( )( )1/ /S N S Nw w W H h h−= ,                           (6) 
 
where ( )( ).1−HW  is the composition of the W function in equation (2) and the inverse of 
the H function in equation (4).  If the functions w(.) and h(. ) are isoelastic, so the EE 
and HH equations, (2) and (4), are respectively 
 
( )( ) WNSNS aaww ηλλ )1/(// −= , ( ) ( ) hhNSNS bbhh ηη λλ )1/(// −= − ,  
 
then the ZZ relationship takes the form, 
  
ZZ:                        ( )( ) ( ) // / / /w w hS N S N S N S Nw w a a b b h h
η η η= .   (6’) 
 
In our analysis we do not impose that these functions are globally isoelastic – some of 
the curvatures illustrated in following diagrams certainly violate this property.  The 
isoelastic form is nevertheless useful as a way of capturing relationships in the 
neighbourhood of the symmetric equilibrium.  At this point, elasticities have the same 
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values in both regions, and we will describe the slopes of relationships at the symmetric 
equilibrium in terms of elasticities.  Thus, from now on elasticities are always 
understood to be evaluated in the neighbourhood of the symmetric equilibrium.  The 
configuration of figure 1 therefore holds because the ZZ schedule is downward sloping 
at the symmetric equilibrium, i.e.  0/ <hw ηη .  Notice that, if 0>hη , then this 
obviously requires a negative elasticity of earnings with respect to employment,  
0<wη . 
 
3.2   Competing regions: 
The case illustrated in figure 1 assumes that there are diminishing marginal returns to 
labour ( 0<wη ), so that along the EE curve higher levels of employment are associated 
with lower wages.  But at the heart of much of the literature on urban systems and new 
economic geography is the idea that this relationship may be positive as a consequence 
of increasing, rather than diminishing, returns to activity in an area.  The mechanisms 
underlying this are discussed in more detail in section 5, but for now we simply 
consider the implications of this for the equilibrium.  The EE curve is now positively-
sloped as shown in figure 2, and so higher relative employment in S also implies higher 
relative wages.  The change in the slope of the EE curve affects the slope of ZZ schedule 
and this has major implications for the comparative static properties of the model as we 
shall see in section 4.  It is the positive slope of the ZZ schedule that defines this case as 
‘competing regions’ and, in terms of elasticities this occurs when 0/ >hw ηη  (equation 
(6’)); if 0>hη , then this obviously requires a positive elasticity of earnings with respect 
to employment, 0>wη . 
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Although the slope of the ZZ curve has reversed, the equilibrium illustrated in 
figure 2 is still stable.  Relatively high values of λ map into points on ZZ below the MM 
line, meaning that real incomes in S are low relative to those in N and so there is 
migration from S to N which moves λ towards its equilibrium value.  This stability 
comes about because the slope of ZZ is less than that of MM, and for this we require that 
the elasticities satisfy 0>> wh ηη .  That is, as the labour force in a region increases, the 
cost of living needs to rise proportionately faster than earnings. Again, for reasons that 
will become clear when we turn to comparative statics, we refer to this situation as the 
“competing case”. 
  
3.3 Divergent regions: 
The symmetric equilibrium of this model is unstable if increasing returns in the 
earnings-employment relationship are sufficiently strong, relative to the increasing costs 
in the cost of living relationship.  This case is illustrated in figure 3. The EE curve is as 
in figure 2 but the cost of living curve, HH, is drawn differently.  For the moment, focus 
only on the area around the symmetric equilibrium and note that the cost of living now 
responds less sharply to population changes.  This in turn produces a ZZ schedule which 
is steeper than the MM curve, and as a result the symmetric equilibrium is unstable.  In 
this case, if λ is relatively high then ZZ lies above MM; real incomes in S are above 
those in N and migration from N to S increases λ further.  This situation results when the 
underlying parameters are such that 1/ >hw ηη . 
 If the equilibrium is unstable, what happens?  There may be no other 
intersection of the MM and ZZ curves in which case one of the regions empties out, with 
λ going to zero or one.  Alternatively, it may be the case that as population levels in the 
two regions become very unequal, the cost-of-living becomes more responsive to 
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further changes in population, resulting in a ‘bendy shaped’  HH curve, as shown in 
figure 3.6   This shape transfers to the ZZ curve, and implies that there are two 
asymmetric equilibria, in addition to the symmetric equilibrium already discussed.  
These are both stable (ZZ is less steep than MM at the point of intersection) and 
‘competing’ (ZZ has positive gradient, as in figure 2).  Thus, regions with similar 
underlying characteristics may be observed to have quite different population levels, 
wages and living costs. 
 
 Figures  3 & 4 here 
 
3.4 Regime summary: 
Figure 4 summarises the relationship between the slopes of the relationships (measured 
by elasticities at the symmetric equilibrium) and the complementary, competing and 
divergent cases we have outlined.  If 0>hη , as assumed in all the figures in the paper, 
then increasing wη  moves the system from complementary to competing to divergent, 
as illustrated.  Increasing returns, 0>wη , is necessary for regions to be competing and 
if these are strong enough they overturn the force for dispersion captured by 0>hη , 
giving divergence.  If  0<hη  then this force for dispersion is removed, and regimes are 
as illustrated on the left hand side of figure 4.  The models underlying this case – in 
particular KRUGMAN’s, 1991a core-periphery model – are discussed in section 5. 
 
4.   Regional Linkages. 
 
We now turn to investigating the comparative static properties of the model.  To do this 
we assume that one region (S) is affected by some exogenous ‘shock’, and then see how 
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inter-regional economic adjustment restores the equilibrium of the economy.  For 
obvious reasons we only look at changes to a stable equilibrium, and we commence 
with a shock that shifts the EE relationship, i.e. a productivity shock. 
 
(Figures 5 a and b here) 
 
4.1 Productivity shock: 
Region S experiences a positive productivity shock, such as an infrastructure investment 
or some other supply side improvement. The direct effect of the shock is to shift the EE 
schedule upwards, as illustrated by the vertical arrows in figure 5a (for the case where 
the regions are complementary) and figure 5b (competing regions).  This shows that at 
given employment levels, the earnings of labour in S are increased.  This upwards shift 
in EE shifts the ZZ schedule upwards by an identical amount7, and the new (long-run) 
equilibrium is at the intersection of this new ZZ schedule and the MM line (illustrated by 
the outer rectangle of dashed lines in figures 5a and 5b)   Qualitatively, the effects of the 
positive shock to productivity are as expected.  There is an increase in wages in both 
regions and an increase in relative wages in S, wS /wN.  There is migration to S, and 
hence an increase λ, population and employment in S.  This in turn leads to an increase 
in the relative cost of living in S, hS/hN, offsetting the change in relative wages.   
How does the shape of each of the relationships EE and HH affect the nature of 
the linkages between areas?  For the complementary case illustrated in figure 5a, the 
relative wage change is smaller than the initial productivity shock, as can be seen by 
comparing the magnitude of the shifts in EE and ZZ with the associated wage change.  
This is the complementary relationship: a beneficial shock in S first increases wages in 
S, but then interregional migration draws labour into S from N, and as it does so wages 
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in S fall and wages in N rise, partially offsetting the initial effect of the shock.  At the 
same time, these population movements produce changes in relative costs of living with 
house prices in S increasing while those in N decline, offsetting the change in relative 
wages.  Overall, the beneficial shock in S produces higher real wages in both regions, 
with higher employment and house prices in S, but an absolute fall in employment and 
house prices in N.   The magnitude of the changes depends on the elasticities of the 
relationships.  For example, if housing supply is very price inelastic then the HH curve 
is flat, and small changes in relative population cause large changes in relative living 
costs.  In this case, the shock is associated with small changes in relative populations, λ, 
and relatively large changes (and consequent differences) in both wages and living 
costs.  Conversely, very price elastic house supply means that the shock causes large 
movements in population and small long run differences in costs of living and wages.  
In the limit with HH and hence ZZ vertical, relative costs of living are unchanged and 
population movement brings wages back to equality.   
How are things different in the case of competing regions?  It is helpful to think 
first about the borderline case, in which the EE schedule is horizontal. Relative wages 
do not depend on employment levels, so the change in relative wages must be equal to 
the productivity shock.  All adjustment occurs through population movement and its 
consequent effects on living costs.  When the EE relationship is positively-sloped then 
we move from the complementary case of figure 5a to the competing region case of 
figure 5b.  The productivity shock draws labour to S from N as before, but now this 
migration causes further increases in earnings in S, while decreasing earnings in N.  The 
price changes are therefore relatively large, and in particular the wage changes are 
amplified.  Wages in S rise by more than the initial productivity shock, while wages in 
N decline as labour emigrates. Correspondingly large changes in relative population and 
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in the cost of living are necessary therefore in order to equate real wages and restore 
equilibrium.   
Algebraic expressions for all these effects are given in the appendix, and are 
summarised in Table 1.  The productivity shock is of magnitude Saˆ  (^ denotes a 
proportional change).  If 0w <η  (complementary regions, figure 1 and 5a) then there is 
a less than proportional increase in wages in S (i.e. SS wa ˆˆ > ) and wages in N rise.  But 
if  0w >η  (competing regions, figures 2 and 5b) then migration amplifies (rather than 
moderates) the effect in S, giving a larger than proportional wage increase in S and wage 
reduction in N, NSS waw ˆ0ˆˆ >>> .  In both cases the cost of living (and house prices) in 
S increase while they fall in N, the magnitude of these effects being greater the larger is 
wη .  The change in the relative living costs in the two regions, NS hh ˆˆ − , is less than the 
productivity shock if regions are complementary, but greater than the productivity 
shock if regions are competing. 
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Table 1 here 
Figures 6 a and b here 
 
4.2 Land supply shock: 
As a second experiment, we consider the effect of a shock that enables S to have a 
higher population with unchanged cost of living.  Perhaps the best example of this is a 
change in land use regulations that allows S to expand the stock of land available for 
housing.  The effect is to shift the HH curve left or downwards (a lower cost of living 
for the same size labour force), this translating into a similar size shift to the left of the 
ZZ curve.   
The effects for complementary regions are illustrated in figure 6a, and the new 
equilibrium is at the points on the dashed rectangle lying to the “south-west” of the old 
equilibrium.  The effects can be traced out as follows.  With given population, the shock 
leads to a fall in house prices in S, reducing living costs and raising real wages. This 
leads to migration to S from N and, with diminishing returns to labour, wages fall in S 
and increase in N.  The net result (once real wages are equalised by migration) is lower 
house prices and lower cost of living in both regions, with the house price decline 
greater in S than in N, to compensate for the lower wages in S (row 1, table 2). 
If regions are competing then results change radically.  With an upwards sloping 
EE curve (figure 6b) the shift establishes the new equilibrium on the outer rectangle of 
dashed lines.  As before, the initial fall in house prices in S leads to in-migration, but 
this now raises earnings in S and reduces them in N, widening the gap in real wages. 
This attracts further inflows of labour, and the process is equilibrated only when the 
relative cost of living in S has increased sufficiently, as shown in the figure.  Increasing 
the stock of housing in S must therefore increase the relative cost of living in S, hS /hN .  
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If the EE schedule is sufficiently steep, the new equilibrium requires that absolute house 
prices in S increase in response to the construction of more houses!  The intuition here 
is that of agglomeration.  Increasing returns are large enough that population continues 
to flow into the region until choked off by higher house prices.  Formally, this case 
arises if Khw /ηη > , where K is the number of regions (so K = 2 in the diagrammatic 
analysis).  This is a condition that is quite consistent with stability of equilibrium, and 
the full listing of possibilities is given in table 2.   
Table 2 here 
 These two examples illustrate the importance of understanding whether regions 
are complementary or competing and show how qualitative, as well as quantitative, 
effects of policy change depend on the elasticities of some key relationships.  Similar 
analyses can be conducted for other parameter changes – such as amenity changes – or 
for combined packages of policy change.  Rather than undertaking more of these 
exercises, we now turn to the mechanisms underlying our reduced form relationships. 
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5.   The Earnings – Employment Relationship  
 
The analysis presented above is based on reduced form relationships.  While there has 
been a long tradition in the urban systems literature of using such reduced forms for 
modelling purposes (see, e.g., HENDERSON, 1998), more recent literature seeks to go 
behind these relationships. In the remainder of the paper we consider the mechanisms 
that underpin these reduced form relationships and link these to the existing literature, 
theoretical and empirical.   We start with the EE schedule which, as we have seen, is 
crucial in determining whether regions are complementary, competing or divergent.   
A standard perfectly competitive model of production implies that additional 
employment in a region either reduces earnings or leaves them unchanged, 0≤wη . This 
is because, with non-increasing returns to scale, perfect competition, and some 
regionally fixed factor (call it capital), adding labour to a region increases the labour-
capital ratio, thereby reducing the marginal product of labour.  If capital were mobile or 
additional labour could be employed by changing the sectoral structure of production 
while holding labour-capital ratios in each sector constant (as in Heckscher-Ohlin trade 
theory) then earnings would be independent of employment, 0=wη .
8   
Once we move outside the standard competitive framework it is possible that 
increased employment may be associated with higher wages, and the literature focuses 
on three basic mechanisms -- a classification that fits with that of MARSHALL (1890). 
The first is a market failure in the product market, modelled in the ‘new economic 
geography’ literature as an interaction between firm-level returns to scale and transport 
costs (section 5.1).  The second is market failure in input markets, particularly the 
labour market (section 5.2), and the third is a range of technological externalities 
(section 5.3).   
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5.1 New economic geography: 
At the heart of ‘new economic geography’ models is a trade-off between two features.  
First, production within firms exhibits increasing returns to scale, implying that each 
firm wants to concentrate its production in one location, not spread it between many.  
Second, there are trade costs in shipping goods, implying that firms gain from 
producing close to their markets.  The combined effect of these two features is that 
firms seek to locate in regions with good market access, and this will tend to bid up 
wages in these regions.  But good market access is itself a consequence of having a 
large population.  This provides the basis for a positive relationship between population 
and wages – i.e. an upward-sloping EE schedule. 
The formal modeling of this follows from KRUGMAN, 1991a.  The 
manufacturing sector contains firms that have increasing returns to scale and produce 
differentiated products, as in DIXIT and STIGLITZ, 1977. Product differentiation 
means that firms engage in intra-industry trade, with each firm supplying all regions, 
although the presence of transport costs means that firms’ sales are skewed towards 
their ‘home’ market.  The industry is monopolistically competitive, so the number of 
firms in each location is determined by a zero profit condition. 9  This condition is the 
key part of the EE relationship, and in the literature is sometimes referred to as the wage 
equation (FUJITA et al., 1999).  It implicitly defines the wage at which firms in each 
region make zero profits, and this wage is an increasing function of regional expenditure 
or market size.  Adding an income/ expenditure relationship which makes expenditure 
in each region an increasing function of employment, gives a positive relationship 
between employment and earnings, 0>wη  and makes regions competing rather than 
complementary. 
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Krugman’s model is a fully specified general equilibrium model, from which it 
is possible to derive exact conditions under which the relationship between regions 
switches from being competing to being divergent, with clustering of manufacturing 
activity in one region.  This turns out to be more likely the greater is the proportion of 
economic activity that is mobile (e.g. non-agricultural activity) and the lower are 
transport costs.  One of the main points that Krugman sought to make was that 
economic integration – lowering transport costs – could trigger regional divergence. 
The Krugman model has been developed in many directions, and we note just 
two of them.  One is that the results are not dependent on the standard Dixit-Stiglitz 
model of product differentiation and monopolistic competition.  The fact that a large 
market is attractive to firms, so leading to higher equilibrium wages in the larger 
market, holds for other forms of competitive interaction between firms (IRMEN and 
THISSE, 1998, COOMBES and LAFOURCADE, 2003). 
Another extension was to add intermediate goods (VENABLES 1996, 
KRUGMAN and VENABLES, 1995).  In the basic Krugman model proximity to a 
large market tends to raise profits (or, with free entry, wages).  The presence of 
intermediate goods means that market size depends not just on final consumers, but also 
on the presence of other firms who demand intermediate goods, and the effect of this is 
to amplify the value of being in an economically large region.  Furthermore, firms also 
save transport costs from locating close to their suppliers. These effects (sometimes 
referred to as forward and backward linkages) serve to create increasing returns within 
and between manufacturing sectors, so much so that agglomeration of manufacturing 
can occur even if labour is immobile.  The main point for current purposes is that the 
presence of intermediate goods amplifies the positive relationship between earnings and 
employment, so will tend to make wη  larger. 
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5.2  Thick market effects: 
Large markets are often more efficient than small markets – an argument that applies in 
labour and capital markets as well as in product markets.  In equilibrium, these ‘thick 
market effects’ translate into a positive relationship between a region’s labour force and 
the wage rate.  A number of mechanisms have been explored in the literature.  One is 
matching; the larger the pool of workers that a firm can access the more likely it is to be 
able to find the exact skills that suits its needs (HELSLEY and STRANGE, 1990; 
AMITI and PISSARIDES, 2005).  Another is risk sharing; if firms are subject to 
idiosyncratic shocks then a larger labour market exposes workers to less risk by 
increasing the probability of re-employment if they are made redundant (KRUGMAN, 
1991b.  Perhaps the most important argument is that a large labour market increases the 
incentives for workers to undertake training.  In a small market, workers who acquire 
specialist skills may be ‘held-up’ by monopsonistic employers, in which case there is no 
incentive for them to invest in skills.  The presence of a large number of potential 
employers removes this threat of opportunistic behaviour, and thereby increases the 
incentives for skill acquisition (MATOUSCHEK and ROBERT-NICOUD 2005).  
 
5.3 Knowledge spillovers and externalities: 
The third set of arguments underlying a positive EE relationship is something of a 
catch-all residual category.  Knowledge spillovers are easier between proximate firms 
than remote ones.  The mechanism may be labor mobility, face-to-face social contact 
between workers, or ability to observe the practices of other firms.  Such effects are 
particularly important in innovation intensive activities, and a large literature points to 
the resulting spatial concentration of innovative activities (e.g. AUDRETSCH and 
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FELDMAN, 2004).  Location specific knowledge spillovers also arise as firms learn 
about the characteristics of knowledge transmission (GLAESER, 1999).  Much work 
(including JACOBS, 1969) focuses on cities as centres of innovative activity.  These 
approaches are surveyed in DURANTON and PUGA, 2004 and their implications for 
urban systems analysed in ABDEL-RAHMAN and ANAS, 2004.   
 Of course, high levels of population and employment create some negative 
externalities as well as positive ones, most obviously because of congestion.  The 
magnitude and balance between these effects is thus an empirical matter.  This is the 
issue to which we now turn.   
 
5.4  The EE relationship: The empirical evidence: 
Empirically, what do we know about the EE relationship?  That is, what can the data tell 
us about the relationship between the size of a city/region and the productivity of firms 
and hence the level of earnings within the locality? 
One approach to this problem is to estimate the production function directly with 
total factor productivity (the value of production for given inputs of labour and capital) 
modelled as a function of variables related to city/region size, for example 
population/employment density.   The unit of observation might be the firm, the city-
industry or the city.  Regardless, in general terms, this involves estimating a relationship 
of the form: 
 
Value of production = f (labour, skills, capital, density, diversity, specialisation, sector 
specific variables, city fixed effects, time dummies)  (7) 
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Following this approach yields a number of findings. The net effect of density on total 
factor productivity is estimated to be positive (ROSENTHAL and STRANGE, 2004). 
This observation confirms that cities exist because there are productivity advantages 
when economic agents are located together (agglomeration economies) that more than 
offset the congestion costs associated with higher densities.  That is, cities are not just 
about shared public goods and/or rent seeking.   Furthermore, cities are different sizes 
because the extent of agglomeration economies varies across different production 
activities (ROSENTHAL and STRANGE, 2004). Some production activities 
(particularly in high-tech sectors) benefit from being in places where lots of similar 
activity is taking place (localisation economies) while others benefit from locating in a 
diverse environment (urbanisation economies) (HENDERSON, 2003).  The largest 
cities tend to be diversified, while smaller cities are more specialised. (DURANTON 
and PUGA, 2000,  2001). 
The major drawback of the ‘production function’ approach is that it is very 
demanding in terms of data.  Obtaining measures of capital stock at the city/region level 
is particularly problematic.  An alternative approach is to work directly with the 
relationship between wages and employment/population. In this case, the general form 
of the relationship is: 
 
Wage = f (labour, skills, density, diversity, specialisation, sector specific variables,   
   city fixed effects, time dummies)      (8) 
 
Comparing this to the specification in equation (7), the only differences are that the 
wage is the dependent variable and measures of capital stock are no longer included on 
 25 
the right-hand side.  This relationship has sound theoretical foundations providing the 
price of capital is the same in all cities/regions.    
Looking across this literature, there is strong evidence of a positive relationship 
between earnings and employment/population at the city/region level. Doubling 
population density increases wages by between 3 and 6%. For evidence relating to the 
US, see CICCONE and HALL, 1995; for selected EU countries, see CICCONE, 2002; 
for the UK, see RICE et al, 2006; for France, see COMBES, DURANTON and 
GOBILLON, 2004.  There is some evidence of direct interaction across neighbouring 
locations.10  Ciccone identifies an additional effect of approximately 3% from the 
employment density of neighbouring regions. However, these effects appear to decline 
steeply with distance. In the case of the UK, for example, RICE et al, 2006 find no 
evidence of effects between locations more than 80 minutes apart in terms of travel 
time.  Decreasing travel time or distance by 10% between regions results in predicted 
productivity gains of 1.14% and 0.24% in the UK and France, respectively. 
Analysis of relationships such as (7) and (8) requires that we control carefully 
for differences in the skill composition of the workforce across locations.   Evidence 
from RICE et al, 2006 suggests that one third of UK regional inequalities in earnings 
can be explained by differences in skill composition.  For France, COMBES et al, 2004 
suggest a somewhat larger effect, with around 50% of regional inequality explained by 
differences in skills, while urbanisation and localisation economies explain about 20%. 
Controlling for skill is inherently problematic because of sorting effects.  Formal 
measures of training or occupation only capture part of workers’ abilities, and if there is 
a positive correlation between the unmeasured part of ability and workers’ decisions to 
live in large urban areas, then  econometric work will tend to overstate the productivity 
effects of cities.  
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The approaches reviewed above focus on the static aspects of agglomeration 
economies. There is another strand of literature on agglomeration economies concerned 
with the dynamics of urban growth. A simple specification to study the role of dynamic 
externalities can be derived by assuming local externalities affect the growth rate, rather 
than the level of productivity: i.e. 
 
Growth in the value of production between period t-s and period t = f (density at time t-
s, diversity at time t-s, specialisation at time t-s)  (9) 
 
This approach is often applied to long-run growth rates, that is with s quite large and 
allowing the effects to differ across sectors. Unfortunately, data on production by 
regions and sectors is scarce and rarely available at different points in time. For these 
reasons, many studies analyse the growth of employment instead of the growth in 
production (GLAESER at al , 1992, HENDERSON et al, 1995). More recent studies use 
time series econometrics to estimate full dynamic models of employment (for example: 
HENDERSON, 1997; COMBES et al, 2004). 
 In summary, the existing evidence suggests that, at least for some range of city 
sizes, the EE relationship may well be upward sloping, 0>wη .
11  A number of 
econometric difficulties remain to be fully resolved (e.g. endogeneity, the need to 
control for compositional characteristics) but the recent literature that has begun to 
address these issues still points to a positive relationship.  
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6.  The Cost of Living and Migration 
 
While much of the research effort has focussed on the relationship between employment 
and earnings, our analytical discussion makes clear that the role of migration and the 
relationship between the cost-of-living and population size are also important in shaping 
economic linkages across space.  In this section we briefly review the evidence relating 
to these although, relative to work on the EE curve, the literature tends to be more 
eclectic in terms of methodology and applications. 
 
6.1 The cost-of-living and the HH relationship 
The cost-of-living depends on product prices, the price of land and housing, and 
additional costs such as commuting.  The original new economic geography models 
(KRUGMAN 1991a and following) ignored housing, rents, and intra-regional transport, 
so the costs of living are determined only by the price of goods.  This tends to generate 
a negative HH relationship – regions with a large population have lower living costs – 
the opposite of the relationship illustrated in the preceding figures.  There are three 
related arguments for this.  The first is that a large region tends to have lower transport 
costs because a smaller proportion of goods are imported.  The second is that there is a 
wider range of products on offer (think of non-tradable goods such as restaurants) and, 
given that people like variety, these have the effect of bringing down the cost of 
producing utility (and hence the true cost of living index).  The third is that competition 
between firms is more intense in a dense area of activity, and this brings down prices for 
consumers.  
While these product market factors are important, empirically they often seem to 
be outweighed by considerations relating to land and housing, aspects that were crucial 
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in earlier work on urban and regional economics.12  A positive HH relationship could be 
based on simply postulating an upwards-sloping supply of land for housing, so 
increasing population raises its price.  An alternative, on which much of the urban 
economics literature is based, supposes that the price of each marginal unit of land in 
the area is constant.  However, commuting costs within each city create a premium on 
city centre land.  Thus, in the simplest model, all employment takes place in the ‘central 
business district’ (CBD).  Urban land rents adjust so that, in equilibrium, all individuals 
are indifferent about where in the city they are housed and, since commuting costs 
increase with distance from the CBD, land rents must decline with distance.  What does 
this imply for the relationship between city size and cost of living, that is the HH 
schedule?  In the simplest case (a linear city, equal size residential lots and commuting 
costs proportional to distance) the cost of urban living (rent plus commuting cost) 
increases with the square of population.  More generally, the cost is increasing and 
convex. 
The standard empirical model of the housing market consists of a demand 
equation that determines house prices in the short run as a function of the housing stock, 
population, income per household, interest rates etc; a supply equation that determines 
the supply of new housing; and an adjustment equation determining how the stock of 
houses adjusts over time as new houses are completed.  Within this framework, the long 
run impact of population change on house prices depends on the price elasticities of 
housing demand and supply13. A recent review of evidence for the UK suggests that the 
price elasticity of demand for housing is of the order of  -0.5.  If the supply of housing is 
price inelastic then the elasticity of house prices with respect to the number of 
households is estimated to be between 1.7 and 2.5 (MEEN and ANDREWS, 1998; 
MEEN, 2003).  The larger is the supply elasticity the less responsive are house prices to 
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population changes in the long run (i.e. the steeper is the HH curve). For example, 
increasing the supply elasticity to 1 reduces the elasticity of house prices with respect to 
population changes to less than 1.  However, given that new housing construction is 
small in relation to the existing housing stock, prices may be very slow in achieving 
their long run equilibrium values. Evidence from model simulation suggests that with a 
supply elasticity of around 1, house prices would remain significantly above their long 
run equilibrium value some 40 years after an initial increase in population (MEEN and 
ANDREWS, 1998). 
Recent estimates of the price elasticity of housing supply vary widely across 
countries.  For the UK, BARKER, 2004 reports a range of estimates for the price 
elasticity of supply of new housing from about 0.3 to 1.0; with evidence of substantial 
variation in supply elasticities across regions (see e.g. MEEN, 2003).  SWANK et al, 
2002 provide international comparisons of the price elasticity across countries, ranging 
from lows of 0.3 for the Netherlands and 0.5 for the UK to highs of 1.4 for the US and 
2.1 for Germany.  The constraints imposed by the planning system play a major role in 
determining supply elasticity. For example, the land use planning system in the UK 
determines the supply of land essentially independently of price. Since a central 
intention of this planning is to contain urban development by fixing growth boundaries, 
the supply of space is quasi-fixed. While it is possible to increase the density of 
occupation of a given land area, evidence suggest that this margin of flexibility has not 
been sufficient to prevent the elasticity of supply of housing from decreasing in the UK 
between the early and later parts of the 20th century as supply constraints became 
binding (MALPEZZI and MACLENNAN, 2001). A number of studies of US regional 
housing markets have identified low supply elasticity of housing due to land use 
regulations as an important factor behind rapid housing price increases in a number of 
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US metropolitan areas, most notably San Francisco, Boston and Los Angeles 
(EVENSON 2002; GLAESER and GYOURKO, 2003; GLAESER et al., 2005).  
GYOURKO at al, 2006 point to the role of heterogeneity in locations’ endowment of 
amenities, and the likelihood that supply elasticities might be particularly low in 
desirable locations.  Combining this with widening income inequality creates rising 
house prices in desirable ‘superstar cities’.  
Finally, what of the possibility that house prices and hence the cost of living are 
directly affected by changes in wages? The consensus in the empirical literature is that 
the long run effect on house prices of changes in income per household (i.e. wages) is at 
least as great as that of changes in the number of households (REF). However, as 
demonstrated in section 4, with a positive earnings-employment relationship, 
productivity shocks give rise to positively correlated movements in house prices and 
wages, even in the absence of any direct causal link between wages and house prices. 
The possible joint endogeneity of house prices and household incomes and the 
implications for estimation of the income elasticity of demand for housing are issues 
which have been hitherto ignored in the literature.  This discussion serves to highlight, 
once again, that the reduced form relationships are helpful for simplifying and thinking 
through the nature of linkages but that further progress will require a more detailed 
understanding of the exact nature of the underlying processes. 
 
6.2  Migration and the MM relationship: 
The third key ingredient is migration.  How mobile is labour between regions?  
Answering this question is difficult, because it is quite possible that very high degrees 
of potential mobility coexist with low levels of actual mobility, precisely because 
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housing prices are acting to equilibrate flows, making households indifferent between 
living in different regions. 
On average 1 percent of households migrate between major regions of the UK 
each year, with net outflows from London, the North East, North West and West 
Midlands and net inflows into the South East, South West and East (HM TREASURY, 
2001).  The empirical evidence for the UK supports the contention that workers’ 
location decisions are responsive to real wage differentials.  A body of econometric 
evidence has built up showing that high relative wages significantly increase net 
migration into a region; while high relative house prices discourage it (see MURPHY, 
et al, 2006 for a recent review).  There is also evidence of a migration/commuting trade-
off (JACKMAN and SAVOURI, 1996; Murphy et al, 2006).  For contiguous regions, 
where relatively cheap commuting offers an alternative to migration, the location 
decision tends to be more strongly influenced by housing price differentials and less 
influenced by wage differentials.  The reverse is true if commuting is more costly.  This 
suggests that migration in the UK will move the economy along the ZZ curve towards 
the intersection with the MM curve where real incomes are equalised.   
One important caveat is in order, however. Within these average mobility rates 
there are large variations in migration rates between skill groups, with higher skill 
groups displaying a significantly higher propensity to move between locations than their 
lower skilled counterparts. A number of possible explanations have been offered for this 
difference. The costs of migration – particularly those associated with transacting in the 
housing market – may be relatively greater for lower skilled workers (HUGHES and 
MCCORMICK, 2000).  Lower skilled workers tend to rely more heavily on local 
informal networks of contacts for information regarding the job market.  Finally, the 
external benefits associated with ‘thick’ labour markets produce clustering of high 
 32 
skilled jobs. Workers sort by location whereby more able workers group themselves in 
particular locations where there are the largest economic returns. In particular contexts, 
we may want to allow for these differences in mobility across different groups. 
 
7.   Conclusion 
 
We have argued that three relationships play a key role in determining the economic 
linkages between cities.  The first concerns the link between local employment and 
earnings, the second the link between local employment and the cost of living and the 
third the migration response to differences in real wages between locations.  These three 
relationships provide the basis for a diagrammatic framework for analysing the linkages 
between cities or regions. We can use this framework to draw out the implications of 
existing theoretical models for the linkages between cities, even though these models 
are not explicitly concerned with these linkages. Perhaps more importantly for policy 
purposes, this diagrammatic framework allows us to consider when gains in one city or 
region spillover positively or negatively to other areas.   
The simple reduced framework set out in sections 3 and 4 highlights the 
importance of the nature of the relationship between employment and earnings in 
determining the direction of spillovers between cities/regions.  If the relationship 
between employment and earnings is negative then complementarity applies, so that a 
positive productivity shock to one city creates positive spillovers to other cities as 
economic adjustment dampens and disperses the impact of shocks.  This outcome is 
reversed if the relationship between employment and earnings is positive as a result of 
agglomeration economies.  In these circumstances cities or regions are in a competitive 
relationship, and the process of adjustment to shocks tends to amplify the gains to one 
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area.  If workers are perfectly mobile then migration flows ensure that these changes in 
nominal earnings do not translate in to differences in real earnings (because the cost of 
living adjusts to offset the earnings differential).  If this is not the case, workers in the 
other cities can see their real standard of living decline. 
Given their importance, what do we know about the nature of the three key 
relationships?  A priori theoretical reasoning cannot help us choose between the 
different possibilities and we must turn instead to empirical evidence. We have 
reviewed the evidence on all three relationships, with a particular focus on the earnings-
employment relationship where, arguably, our degree of ignorance is greatest.  We 
reach a number of conclusions.  First, the nature of the housing market in the UK means 
that the cost of living increases quickly with rising employment.  Second, and consistent 
with our theoretical framework, this cost of living effect implies small migration flows 
between cities, even though the evidence suggests that many workers are quite mobile 
and respond to real earnings differentials between places.  It is likely that commuting 
between cities partially substitutes for the migration that would occur in the absence of 
cost of living effects.  Third, the employment-earnings relationship may be upward 
sloping meaning that population movement between cities or regions tends to widen 
earnings differentials, but this relationship is almost certainly sector and location 
specific.   
This specificity makes it hard to reach general conclusions about magnitudes, 
but does allow us to generalise about the direction of changes induced by the linkages 
between regions.  Specifically, the positive employment relationship, at least for some 
ranges of city sizes points to the possibility of a competing relationship.  As we have 
seen this means that an initial positive shock to, say, productivity in one region will get 
magnified as workers migrate from other regions.  However, as workers migrate, living 
 34 
costs are driven up.  Where housing supply is relatively inelastic, as in the UK, this may 
be associated with quite small movements in population.   
Do the resulting changes in employment, wages and cost of living matter?  For 
mobile workers the answer is almost certainly not. Willingness to migrate ensures that 
real wages are equalized independent of location choice. In the UK, at least, this 
suggests that differences in wages and house prices are not a major issue for young 
skilled graduates who are highly mobile.  For lower skilled workers and others who, for 
one reason or another, may be immobile, the effects are more complicated.  In the 
expanding region, these workers may see increases in housing costs outweighing 
increases in wages if agglomeration effects are larger for skilled than unskilled (which 
empirically may be the case).  In contracting regions the opposite effect may occur.  
These differences will also play out differently depending on the pattern of home 
ownership with implications for wealth as house prices change.  Clearly, further work is 
needed, but our theoretical model, coupled with the limited empirical evidence at least 
provides a starting point for thinking about these issues. 
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Appendix 
There are K regions, and region i has labour forces Li, with ΣiLi  = L.  Wage rates are wi 
costs of living are hi.  We give general forms of relationships and their iso-elastic 
version.  The earnings employment relationship is 
  ( ) w
iiiii
LaLwaw η== ,            (A1) 
where wη  is the elasticity of earnings with respect to employment. The cost of living 
relationship is  
( ) ( ) hiiiii bLbLhh η// == ,            (A2) 
We think of this principally in terms of the housing market, so an increase in bi 
represents an increase in region i housing stock. hη   is the elasticity of the cost of living 
with respect to population.  The migration relationship is 
jjjiii hwchwc // = ,   for all pairs of locations, i, j,    (A3) 
where ci is a shift parameter, and an increase would represent an increase in the amenity 
value of living in region i.  
Using A1 and A2 in A3 equilibrium values of Li satisfy,  
( )
( )
( )
( )jj
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iii
bLh
Lwac
bLh
Lwac
//
= ,   for all pairs of locations, i, j,  
In iso-elastic form:  hwhhwh jjjjiiii LbacLbac
ηηηηηη −− =      (A4) 
Now consider a shock to a particular region, S.  Changes in employment across all 
regions sum to zero, and if we assume that all regions are initially symmetric (Li = Lj for 
all i, j) this condition implies 
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 0ˆ)1(ˆ =−+ jS LKL         (A5) 
where jLˆ  is the proportionate change in each region other than S.  Now differentiating 
A4 and using A5 we derive, in the neighbourhood of the symmetric equilibrium: 
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Elasticities are constant in the iso-elastic case, and otherwise they vary with the level of 
Li (i.e. the size of the economy).  
The effects of various shocks on other endogenous variables are given by using A6 in 
A1 – A3: 
Productivity shock in S: Saˆ  
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Increase house supply in S: Sbˆ  
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Increase amenity in S: Scˆ  
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Cost of living depends on employment and wages:  In the text we have modelled the 
cost of living as a function of employment.  Some of this dependence may come via 
wages, so the h(.) function can be decomposed (using the iso-elastic case) to 
( ) ( ) wwh iiiii LabLh εηε/= , where wε  is the elasticity of the cost of living with respect to 
the wage rate, hε  is the elasticity of the cost of living with respect to labour force 
(conditional on the wage rate), and hη  is the sum of the partial effects, wwhh εηεη += . 
This generalization makes no difference to the figures or qualitative analysis, but 
comparative statics are now based on equation A4’ with A5, where   
  hwwhwhwwhw jjjjiiii LbacLbac
εεηεεεεηεε −−−−−− = )1(1)1(1 .      (A4’) 
The implications of a direct effect of wages on the cost of living, wε  > 0, for the 
analysis of sections 3 and 4 depends on the sign of wη .  If wη <  0 (the complementary 
case) then wε  > 0 makes hη  smaller and the HH curve steeper.  As noted in (4.1) a 
steeper HH curve means that a shock leads to relatively large movements in population 
and small changes in costs of living and wages. With wη > 0 (the competing case), wε  > 
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0 increases the sum of the partial effects, hη .  The HH curve depicted in figures 1-6 
tends to be flatter, and small movements in population lead to relatively large changes 
in living costs of living. Notice that the dividing line between competing and 
complementary cases, that is where wη = 0, is unaffected by allowing an effect through 
wε  > 0.  However, the value of wε  does matter for the emergence of a divergent regime. 
Divergence requires that w h h w wη η ε η ε> = +  , which is not possible if wε  ≥ 1. 
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Table 1:  Equilibrium responses to an increase in productivity in south  
0ˆ >Sa , implying population movement 0ˆ >λ . 
 Proportionate change in 
wages: NS ww ˆ,ˆ . 
Proportionate change in 
cost of living: NS hh ˆ,ˆ . 
Complementary: 
wh ηη >> 0  
0ˆˆˆ >>> NSS wwa  
0ˆˆˆ >−> NSS hha
0ˆ    ,0ˆ <> NS hh  
Constant returns: 
wh ηη => 0  
0ˆˆˆ =>= NSS wwa  
0ˆˆˆ >−= NSS hha  
0ˆ    ,0ˆ <> NS hh  
Competing: 
0>> wh ηη  
NSS waw ˆ0ˆˆ >>>  
0ˆˆˆ >>− SNS ahh  
0ˆ    ,0ˆ <> NS hh  
Stability requires wh ηη >  
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Table 2:  Equilibrium responses to an increase in land supply in south. 
Sbˆ > 0, implying population movement 0ˆ >λ . 
 Proportionate change in 
wages: NS ww ˆ,ˆ . 
Proportionate change in 
cost of living: NS hh ˆ,ˆ . 
Complementary: 
wh ηη >> 0  
0ˆ <Sw , 0ˆ >Nw  0 > SN hh ˆˆ >  
Constant returns: 
wh ηη => 0  
0ˆˆ == NS ww  0 > SN hh ˆˆ =  
Competing: 
0>> wh ηη  
0ˆ >Sw , 0ˆ <Nw  0 > NS hh ˆˆ >  
Competing: 
02/ >>> hwh ηηη  
0ˆ >Sw , 0ˆ <Nw  NS hh ˆ0ˆ >>  
Stability requires wh ηη >  
Figure 1: Complementary regions 0; 0h wη η> <  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Figure 2:  Competing regions 0h wη η> >  
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Figure 3: Divergent regions 0w hη η> >  
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Figure 4:  Regime Summary  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
Figure 5: Productivity improvement in S 
(a) Complementary regions      (b) Competing regions 
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Figure 6: Increased land in S 
(a) Complementary regions     (b) Competing regions 
 
  
 
                                                  
1  Exogenous differences can be captured by region specific parameters.  Some sources 
of endogenous variation can be captured in our reduced form relationships (for example, 
participation depends on the wage which in turn depends on λ) but for clarity we leave 
these forces in the background.  
2  If the production function is Cobb-Douglas and other factors are fixed then wη  + 1 is 
equal to the elasticity of output with respect to labour. 
3  With non-constant returns to scale it is also possible that the shape of these functions 
depends on total population. 
4   Comparative static analysis of a change in productivity parameters would then shift 
this relationship, an effect that we ignore in section 4 but discuss in the appendix. 
5 An additional complication, which could be more easily incorporated, arises from the 
presence of a fixed cost of moving. In this case,  the migration equilibrium schedule 
would be characterised by a band with the upper curve of that band identifying real 
wage differences that are sufficiently high to overcome the fixed cost of moving and 
lead to migration from north to south (and vice versa for the lower band).  All points 
within this band would then represent possible long run equilibria but with the 
remaining analysis essentially unchanged. 
6  This requires that the elasticity of the HH curve varies. This would happen if, for 
example, congestion rises faster with population for small cities (perhaps because it is 
inefficient to offer public transport) and large cities than for medium size cities. Varying 
elasticity on the EE curve could also achieve this if there were diminishing returns over 
some range of city sizes and increasing returns over others.  
7  This assumes that the productivity shock does not have any direct effect on the cost of 
living. This assumption is relaxed in the appendix. 
 1 
                                                                                                                                               
8  Factor prices are invariant with respect to a region’s endowment, see Leamer and 
Levinsohn (1995) 
9   The fundamental market failure in the model is increasing returns at the level of the 
firm, meaning that firms do not divide their production between all regions. 
10   This direct interaction is in addition to the equilibrium interactions of our model. 
11 Au and Henderson (2004) provide evidence that productivity effects in China follow 
an inverted-U so that productivity (and hence wages) are only increasing over some 
range of city sizes. 
12   The first attempt to combine Krugman’s model with increasing land prices was 
Helpman (1998). 
13  The elasticity of house prices with respect to population is given by 
/( )d d sLε ε ε+ where 
d
Lε  is the elasticity of demand for housing with respect to 
population ; dε  is the price elasticity of demand for housing and sε  is the price 
elasticity of supply of housing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
